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1. Introduction
Recent work of Kim-Prikry-Yannelis [10, 11], Yannelis [15] and the
authors [8] has shown the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in
games with a measure space of players, each of whose strategy sets
live in a separable Banach space and each of whose pay-offs are
generated by a non-ordered relation. This work solved a problem left
open in [ 7
]
' and relied on (previously unknown) selection theorems of
the Caratheodory type. For motivation to the problem, the reader can
see [6] and [8].
In this paper we present a result that dispenses with any kind of
convexity assumption on the preference correspondence in games with an
atomless measure space of players. Our result can be seen as an
atomless analogue of the purely atomic result of Shafer-Sonnenschein
[14], with the atomless hypothesis enabling us to dispense with their
convexity-type assumption inspite of the infinite dimensional setting.
Indeed, the theorem we present yields a new result even when it is
specialized to a finite dimensional Euclidean space; see Remark 2
below. As such, it generalizes the finite dimensional results in
Khan-Vohra [9], Moreover, unlike [8], [10] and [15] there is no need
for elaborate selection theorems of the Caratheodory type. Our new
method of proof is suggested by [4] in which Grodal asked whether the
assumptions of Theorem 1 in Khan-Vohra [9] were consistent.
2. Preliminary Definitions and the Result
Let (T,E,u) be a complete, finite measure space.
Let E denote a separable Banach space over the real numbers R and
E* its topological dual. The topology a(E,E*) will be referred to as
the weak topology on E. The norm in E will be denoted by •••;:.
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(P (E) will denote the hyperspace of all subsets of E including the
empty set { 4> } . (pf (E) will denote the set of nonempty, closed subsets
of E and (p,(E) the set of nonempty, compact subsets of E. Aw in
front of f or k will mean that the closedness or compactness is with
respect to the weak topology on E. Ac after f or k will denote that
the set is in addition convex. For any A, B in ir (E) we shall use the
following notation.
con A : convex hull of A.
A : complement of A in E.
A\B : set-theoretic subtraction.
We shall also denote the open 5-ball around x by B.(x) and the set of
o
positive integers by N.
I— will denote the space of all (equivalence classes of) E-valued
E
Bochner integrable functions defined on T with
M, -J l|f(t)||dU .
T
We shall abbreviate L by L . For any multifunction F: T -» (P(E)\{$}
,
we shall denote by S_ the set ff e L_: f(t) e F(t) a.e. in TJ
.
F E
A multifunction F: T * O^ (E)\{$] is said to he measurable if the
graph of F, |(t,x) e T x E: x e F(t)l, is an element of I « uJ (E)
where (Ju> (F) is the norm Borel a-algebra on E and 8 denotes the
product a-algebra. A measurable multifunction is said to be integrably
bounded if there exists g e L such that sup{jjxjj: x e F(t)} _< g(t) a.e.
in T.
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Finallv, for any two topological spaces X, Y, a multifunction
4;: X Lr (Y)*v{<J>| is said to be upper hemicontinuous if the set
{x e X: i|)(x) C VJ is open in X for every open subset V of Y.
We now have all the terminology that we need to present our result
Following Schmeidler [13], we neglect the distinction between func-
tions and their equivalence classes.
Theorem . If
1) (T,E,u) is atomless and such that L (u) is separable :
2) X: T -* ft* , (E) is integrablv bounded:
wkc
3) A: T x si * (? c (E) such thatX w wrc
(i) for all t £ T, for all x e S , A(t,x) C X(t),
( i i ) for all t e T , A ( t , • ) is an upper hemicontinuous multi -
function from (S , weak) to (E, norm),
A.
—
—
(iii) for all x e S
,
the graph of A(»,x) belongs to £® £?(E);
4) P: T x S_ + (P(F.\\$} such that
(i) for all x e S , x(t) 4 P(t,x) a.e. in T
,
( i i ) for all t e T , P ( t , • ) is an upper hemicontinuous multi -
function from (S
,
weak) to (E, norm),
(iii) for all x e S , the graph of P(«,x) belongs to E» O(E):
A
then there exists x* z S such that a.e. in T
,
x*(t) e A(t,x*) and
A(t,x*) O P(t,x*) = UK
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Remarks .
1. Note that our assumptions do not rule out the existence of x e S
A.
such that P(t,x)/0 X(t) = { <f> } a.e. in T.
2. The result presented above is a far-reaching generalization of
Theorem 2 in [9] for the case of an atomless measure space of
players. It improves that result even when E is assumed to be
I
R as can be seen by comparing the hypotheses on A. In particular,
4(i) is a weakening of the hypothesis: for all x e S
,
x( t ) i con
A
P(t,x) a.e. in T.
3. The result presented above relates to Theorem 2 in [8] and Theorem
3.1 in [10], From the viewpoint of potential applications in eco-
nomics, it dispenses with the inferiority hypothesis on A(t,x) found
in both papers. More generally, it allows one to dispense with the
topology on T and the Hausdorff continuity assumptions found in
[8] and with the restrictive assumptions on E found in [10].
However, neither Theorem 2 in [8] nor Theorem 3.1 in flO] require u
to be an atomless measure. This is no real restriction since the
primary interest of this work is in showing the existence of pure
strategy equilibria in which case u is atomless; see [7] and [13].
3. Proof of the Theorem
The novelty in the proof lies in Claim 4 and as remarked in the
introduction, this claim is suggested by an assertion in [4], The
I
essential argument for the proof of this claim in the context of R
can be traced to [4].
Note that the proof makes no use of a utility indicator as in [9]
or a Caratheodory selection theorem as in [8], [10] and [15].
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The proof consists of a series of claims.
Claim 1. S is compact in the weak topology generated by the norm in
A
This is a consequence of a result of Papageorgiou [10, Theorem 4.2].
Claim 2. S is nonempty and convex.
—
'
A
Convexity is a straightforward consequence of the convex valuedness
of X(«). Nonemptiness is a consequence of the Aumann-St. Beuve measur-
able selection theorem [2, Theorem Til. 22].
Claim 3 . The weak topology on S is metrizable.
A
Since F is a separable Banach space and y is such that L (u) is
separable, L„ is separable; see, for example, [5, p. 381]. The claim
then follows as a consequence of the fact that weakly compact subsets
of a separable Ranach space are metrizable [3, Theorem V.6.3].
Claim 4 . For all x E S , A(t,x)/0 P(t,x) = f <J> } a.e. in T.
A
If not, there exists x' e S and V z E, u(V) > such that
A
A(t,x')/0 P(t,x') * {(J)} for all t e V.
Denote the restriction of I to V by Z and the restriction of u to £
by y... Since A(« ,x') and P(» ,x') have measurable graphs, the restric-
tions of A(«,x') and P(«,x') to V also have measurable graphs. Hence
the multifunction A(«,x')f) P(*,x') restricted to V has a measurable
graph. We can then appeal to the Aumann-St. Beuve selection theorem
[2, Theorem III. 22] to assert the existence of a measurahle function
g: V -* F such that
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:(t) e A(t,x')/0 P(t.x') for all t e
Since A(t,x') CX(t) and X(» ) is integrably bounded, pick K e R such
that u(W) > (2/3)u(V) where
W = {t e V: Ijg(t)|j < K and |jx'(t)j| < KJ
.
Next, for all n in N, consider the set
W = (t e W: i|x-x*i|
1
< 1/n => g(t) £ P(t,x)}.
We assert that for any n e N, W e Z,,. To see this, note that the
n V
separability of L_, implies that there exists a countable dense subset
E
(x } vn of B, , (x'). Now consider the set
1
m 1 m>l 1/n
W = { t e W: g(t) e P(t,x )}.
nm m
Since g is a measurable function, it has a measurable graph [2, III. 36],
Since the restriction of P(«,x ) to V has a measurable ^raph, certainly
m
the intersection of the graphs of g and P(*,x ) are measurable. The
m
projection of this intersection on V is the set
V = {t e V: g(t) e P(t,x )}
m l m
By the projection theorem [2, Theorem 111.23], V e £,,. Since W =
rn V nm
W n V , W e E„. Hence (IJH ) e E„. Denote this union bv W.
' m nm V nm V J r\
m>l
Certainly W C W . Finally, we show W Z. W . Towards this end, pickJ
n n n n
any s e W . Then there exists x e B, . (x') such that g(s) e P(s,x ).
n s 1/n s
Now by upper hemicont inui ty of P (t,»), there exists 5(s) > such that
r(s) e P(s,x) for all x e B
.
( .( x5(s)^ Q ).
-7-
Certainlv, there exists an element of fx } X1 , say x . . , such that
m nt/i m(, s
;
x
,
„ £ B p/ N (x ). Hence g(s) £ P(s,x . .), and s e W.
m(s) 6(s) s m(s) n
It is easy to see that \J W = W. Hence there exists n such that
\i n
|i(W—) > (l/2)u(V). Since u is an atomless measure, we can pick W* £ E
n V
W* Z W- such that < u(W*) < (l/2Kn). Define x": T > E such that
n
/ g(t) for all t in W*
x"(t) -1
(^ x'(t) for all t in T\W*
Certainlv }jx -x f || = / }jg( t )-x ' ( t ){| < / (||g(t)i| + ijx'(t)jj) < 2Ky(W*)
W* W*
< (1/n). This implies that x'*(t) £ P(t,x") for all t in W* , a contra-
diction to 4(i). The proof of our claim is complete.
Next, we construct the correspondence a: Sv » S such that
a(x) = {ye S : y(t) £ A(t,x) a.e. in t}
Claim 5 . a is nonempty and convex valued.
Convex valuedness is obvious from the convexity of A(t,x). Non-
emptiness follows from an application of the Aumann-St. Beuve measurable
selection theorem [2, Theorem III. 22],
Claim 6 . a is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence where S is
A
endowed with the weak topology.
The proof follows an argument in [8]; we spell it out here for the
reader's convenience.
Since S with the weak topology is a compact, metric space, it
suffices to show that the graph of a is sequentially closed. Towards
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this end, let y e a(x ), (y ,x ) -> (y,x). We have to show that
' n n n n
y e ct(x). Let A. = conUy. for 1=1,2,... . Since y converges weakly
1 j>i J
to y, by Mazur's theorem [3, V.3.14], for each i=l,2,..., there exists
a sequence (z } in A. such that z converges strongly to y. For any
e > 0, find n such that jjz - yij < e. Similarly for e/m, m > 1, find
m
"*
n such that jjz - y{| < e/m. Proceeding in this way, we can manufac-
m n
m
ture a sequence, appropriately relabelled fz 1, such that z e con U y
.
1
n
1
n
,v J
J>.n
'
and z converges in the L„ norm to y. By passing to a subsequence, if
n K
necessary, we may assume that z (t) converges in the E norm to y(t) for
all t E T\N with y(N) = 0. Fix t e T\N. Since A(t,«) is upper hemi-
continuous from (S , weak) to E, for every 5 > we can find n > 1 such
A —
that k > n implies A(t,x, ) C A(t,x) + B.(0). Hence
— K 6
Con(J A(t,x. ) C A(t,x) + B.(0)
i k k *
=> z (t) e A(t,x) + B.(0)
n o
=> y(t) E A(t,x) + B (0).
On letting 6 go to zero, we conclude that y(t) e A(t,x). Since t e T\N
was arbitrary, we also conclude that y(t) e A(t,x) a.e. in T. The proof
of the claim is finished.
We can now apply Ky-Fan's fixed point theorem fl, Section IX. 5] to
assert the existence of x* e S
A.
x*(t) e A(t,x*) a.e. in T.
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By Claim 3, certainly,
P(t,x*)/0 A(t,x*) = a.e. in T.
The proof of the theorem is finished.
-10-
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